The null hypothesis in assessing earthquake predictions is often, loosely speaking, that the successful predictions are chance coincidences. To make this more precise requires specifying a chance model for the predictions and/or the seismicity. The null hypothesis tends to be rejected not only when the predictions have merit, but also when the chance model is inappropriate. In one standard approach, the seismicity is taken to be random and the predictions are held xed. \Conditioning" on the predictions this way tends to reject the null hypothesis even when it is true, if the predictions depend on the seismicity history. An approach that seems less likely to yield erroneous conclusions is to compare the predictions with the predictions of a\sensible" random 1 prediction algorithm that uses seismicity up to time t to predict what will happen after time t. The null hypothesis is then that the predictions are no better than those of the random algorithm. Signi cance levels can be assigned to this test in a more satisfactory way, because the distribution of the success rate of the random predictions is under our control. Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that there is no evidence that whatever extra-seismic information the predictor uses (electrical signals, e.g.) helps to predict earthquakes.
Introduction
Suppose we are given a seismicity sequence and a set of earthquake predictions. We seek to assess the predictions statistically to determine whether they have merit. We want our test to have signi cance level ; i.e., to know that when the (as yet unspeci ed) null hypothesis is true, we have chance or less of rejecting it erroneously. To reject the null hypothesis is to conclude that the success of the prediction method should not be ascribed to chance coincidence; colloquially, this would be to conclude that the prediction method has merit. A more precise statement is \either the null hypothesis is false, or an event that has probability has occurred." Throughout this note, we shall take = 0:1.
To conclude that the null hypothesis is false is not the same as concluding that the prediction method works, but this distinction is often neglected. We might conclude that the null hypothesis is false neither because the predictions have merit nor because an event with probability occurred, but because the null hypothesis is a probabilistically inadequate model, whether or not the predictions have merit.
It might help to have a simple example in mind. We are given a black box with a button on top and a one-digit display. When we push the button, a number is displayed. We hypothesize that inside the box, a coin is tossed 5 times whenever we push the button, and the display shows the number of times the coin landed \heads." We seek to test the null hypothesis that the coin is fair against the alternative that it has probability greater than 1/2 of landing \heads." Under the null hypothesis, the number displayed has a binomial distribution with parameters n = 5, p = 1=2; under the alternative the number is binomial with n = 5, p > 1=2. If we reject the null hypothesis when the display shows 4 or more, we get a test with signi cance level 0:19.
We push the button, and the display shows 9. We therefore reject the null hypothesis.
However, under the null hypothesis (and under the alternative), 9 is an impossible outcome! It is clear that the null hypothesis is false, but not because of the hypothesized value of p; rather, something more fundamental is wrong with our probabilistic model of the black box.
(In this case, the alternative hypothesis does not explain the observation either.)
Consider another experiment: We have a black box as before, but now we record a history of its output. In the rst nine trials, the output has been f4; 3; 2; 4; 2; 3; 3; 5; 4g. We propose to test the hypothesis that n = 5 and p = 1=2 against the alternative n = 5, p > 1=2, by looking at the number of times in ten trials that the output is 4 or larger. Under the null hypothesis, that number has a binomial distribution with n = 10, p = 3=16, so if we reject when we observe the number 4 or larger four or more times in ten trials, we get a test with signi cance level 0:1. We push the button one more time, and 4 shows on the display, so we reject the null hypothesis. This test does not have the signi cance level claimed. The appropriate computation would have been to nd the conditional probability of observing the number 4 or higher, four or more times in ten trials, given that we had observed 4 or higher four times in the rst nine trials. That conditional probability is clearly unity, not 0:1. The point is that whether we compute a probability or a conditional probability in an hypothesis test can matter a great deal.
One common approach to assessing earthquake predictions (e.g., 11, 17, 23] ) is to model seismicity as a stochastic process, holding the predictions xed, and then to compare the observed success rate of the predictions on the real seismicity with random seismicity generated from the stochastic process model. If the measured prediction success rate exceeds the 90th percentile of the success rate under the stochastic model, one rejects the null hypothesis (at signi cance level = 0:1) to conclude that the prediction method works. There are several problems with this approach:
1. We might reject the null hypothesis not because the predictions have merit, but because the stochastic model of seismicity is poor. An event that appears to be unlikely according to our model of seicmicity might in actuality be quite likely. This idea is illustrated in the rst \black box" example above. An alternative approach is to reformulate the null hypothesis to say that the predictions are no better than those of another, presumably simpler method. I assert that this approach overcomes all three of the problems just mentioned. In this approach, one holds seismicity xed (one conditions on the observed seismicity), and generates random predictions similar in character to given predictions (e.g., the number of predictions, length of alarms, etc.). The algorithm for generating random predictions should be sensible and causal|it should use seismic information up to time t in predicting what will happen after time t. If the observed success rate is regularly exceeded by random predictions, one concludes that the prediction method is not useful, insofar as it does no better than a particular crude automated strategy that uses only seismic information. This approach does not rely on a stochastic model for seismicity, it allows for the possibility that the predictions are a function of seismicity up to the time of each prediction, and it explicitly compares the success rate with that of other methods that rely exclusively on seismic data, not extrinsic observations such as electrical signals. By deliberately introducing chance into the \straw-man" prediction algorithm, one can assign a signi cance level to the test.
The approach was suggested by Stark 18 ], but variants have been suggested by others.
For example, Kagan 7] suggests an extreme case of this approach: the \automatic alarm" strategy, in which one issues an alarm after every su ciently large event; he also compares clustering from both the predictions and the historical seismicity, and the fact that the randomization of the catalog prevents the predictions from exploiting the seismic history.
The primary di erences between this work and those just mentioned is the recognition of the conditional nature of the other approach to hypothesis testing; the deliberate introduction of chance into the comparison prediction algorithms, in order to obtain a more traditional a statistical test; and the rephrasing of the null hypothesis to be \these predictions are no better than those of an (particular) automated strategy," rather than \the observed successes of these predictions are chance coincidences." Introducing chance into the comparison prediction algorithm allows one to adjust the prediction rate to match that of the method being tested in a straightforward way, and allows one to assign a signi cance level to the test.
Simulation Model
The points raised above can be illustrated by simulation. We shall model seismicity as a Gamma renewal process, which is one generalization of a Poisson process. In a Poisson process, the times between events (inter-event times) are independent and identically dis- In spite of their ability to model clustered seismicity, Gamma renewal processes do not have aftershocks per se: a shock does not raise the chance of a new shock by some mechanism; rather, the clock restarts after every event, and the expected rate of seismicity, , is constant over time. This is in contrast to some stochastic models, such as the Epidemic Type Aftershock Model (ETAS) (see Ogata 15, 16] ).
To give a scale to the simulations, we shall calibrate the model to correspond roughly with Greek seismicity from 1987-1989, as reported by SI-NOA and tabulated by Geller 3] .
That tabulation shows an average of 15 events per year with magnitude M S 5:0. We thus x the expected number of events per year ( ) in our simulations to be 15. This will allow us to make a crude test of the VAN 21] earthquake predictions (e.g., 22]), but this paper does not attempt a formal test of the VAN 21] predictions.
Because the observed rate of seismicity is a su cient statistic for the intensity of a homogeneous Poisson process, if we were to assume that the random seismicity sequences we generate were Poisson-distributed, and estimate the intensity by maximum likelihood, the expected value of the estimate would be 15 events/year. (Nothing in estimating the intensity would alert us to the fact that the process was not Poisson, and we would estimate the entire family of Gamma renewal processes with xed to be about the same Poisson process.) We shall generate 3-year sequences of seismicity, which corresponds roughly with the 1987-1989 VAN predictions, treating all of Greece as a single region (i.e., ignoring spatial variations in the seismicity rate).
3 Simulation \Experiments"
First Simulation
The rst simulation illustrates points (1) and (2) Perhaps surprisingly, this test rejects the null hypothesis even when it is true; i.e., even when the model of the seismicity used in the test is the same as that used to generate the original \observed" sequence, and the correct predictions succeed \by chance." This results from conditioning on the predictions: the predictions depend on the seismicity history. They exploit clustering in the sequence from which they derive, by issuing alarms whose duration is somewhat longer than the median inter-event time after some events. While each simulated seismicity sequence has about the same amount of clustering, the clusters are in di erent places, so the predictions are, on average, less successful. This is one of the reasons that conditioning on the predictions tends to yield erroneous conclusions.
The median false alarm rate is higher for the true process than for a Poisson process with the same seismicity rate. This also results from clustering: in the extreme limit of clustering, all the simulated events would occur in one cluster, so if we had n alarms, at least n ? 1 of them would have to be false alarms. On the other hand, conditional on the number of events, the times of the Poisson-distributed events are uniformly distributed over the three-year interval, so we have a positive chance of no false alarms once the number of events equals the number of alarms.
Second Simulation
The second simulation is designed to evaluate the proposed approach to testing the revised null hypothesis; namely, conditioning on the observed seismicity (holding it constant), and comparing the success rate of the observed predictions with that of randomly generated predictions. Using the original seismicity sequence of the rst simulation, simulate 1000 sets of random predictions, corresponding to di erent realizations of the coin-tossing stage of that simulation. Calculate the empirical cdf of the success rate of those predictions; use its 90th percentile as the critical value of the test of the null hypothesis. The results of these simulations are in table 2. In this test, the null hypothesis is appropriately not rejected.
(Note, however, that the original realization of the coin tosses was particularly lucky!) This test behaves as we would like it to, and addresses point (3) of the introduction: without using extrinsic information, a simple rule for predicting seismicity does as well or better than the 0.21 NO 0.33 Table 2 : Results of simulation of testing the revised null hypothesis that the predictions are no better than those of an automatic method that uses no extra-seismic information, conditionally on the observed seismicity, rather than testing the null hypothesis that the successful predictions succeeded by chance, conditionally on the predictions. Col 1: 90th
percentile of success rate of random predictions. Repeat 1000 times; calculate empirical cdf.
predictions being evaluated, more than 10% of the time. Thus the value of any extrinsic information the predictions use (in this case, there is none), has not been established. The null hypothesis, that this method is no better than an automated strategy that uses only seismic information, is not rejected.
Third Simulation
The third simulation repeats the rst two, but with the \observed" seismicity generated from a Poisson process, rather than a more clustered Gamma renewal process. In this case, the particular realization of the process and the coin tosses led to 13 predictions with a total alarm time of 0.69 years (23%). 11% of the events were successfully predicted, and the false-alarm rate was 38%. Note that even for Poisson seismicity, the 90th percentile of the success rate of the random predictions is higher when we condition on the seismicity than when we condition on the predictions. Table 3 : Comparison of testing conditionally on the predictions, and conditionally on the seismicity, when the seismicity is simulated from a Poisson process.
Fourth Simulation
The fourth simulation apes a test of the VAN predictions 22] . To make a more realistic test would require accounting for the spatial heterogeneity of the seismicity rate in Greece, which is beyond the scope of the present work. According to the Preliminary Determination Table 4 shows the result of testing the null hypothesis that the successful predictions are chance coincidences by conditioning on the predictions and modeling the seismicity either as a Poisson process or a Gamma renewal process with the same rate. In both cases, the null hypothesis would have been rejected. Table 5 shows the result of testing the null hypothesis that the VAN predictions are no better than an automated strategy that uses no extra-seismic information, conditional on the observed seismicity. The automatic strategy was to generate random 23-day \alarms" from the observed seismicity, repeating the steps of the earlier simulations, but using a biased coin with probability p = 23=39 of landing \heads" (so that the expected number of predictions, assuming no alarms overlap, agrees with the actual number of VAN predictions).
This resulted in an average of 10 predictions with average total alarm time of 0.95 years (32% of the interval). The 90th percentile of the success rate of the random predictions was 49%, so the null hypothesis would not be rejected.
Discussion
The basic phenomenon exhibited here, that using a conditional hypothesis test or an inappropriate null hypothesis can be misleading, arises in other geophysical problems as well. For example, Hide and Malin 4] found apparently statistically signi cant correlations between the geoid and the geomagnetic eld. Eckhardt 2] showed that those correlations are not meaningful, and that the impression of statistical signi cance came from an inappropriate null hypothesis, which included the assumption that the spectrum of the elds was white (rather than red, as most geophysical elds are), and from the fact that the signi cance level 0.49 NO 0.30 did not account for the fact that certain parameters were tted to maximize the apparent correlation (in Hide and Malin's case, a rotation between the elds). Not accounting for the fact that certain parameters have been adjusted on the basis of the data amounts to a conditional test of the null hypothesis, which we have seen can be quite misleading. Similarly, Morelli and Dziewonski 10] found that the correlation between core-mantle topography models inferred from PcP and PKP travel times were apparently signi cant. They used the same (inappropriate) null hypothesis as Hide and Malin, namely, that the spectrum of CMB heterogeneity is white, and in assigning a signi cance level to the observed correlation, they did not account for the calibration of various parameters, such as the number of singular functions retained in their damped least-squares estimates of topography.
These same e ects are present in some assessments of earthquake predictions, for example, the VAN predictions: Varotsos et al. 23] explicitly advocate the assumption that the times, locations, and magnitudes of events are jointly independent, which is in my opinion certainly false; the null hypothesis has in many cases included the assumption that seismicity (possibly after some data processing to \decluster" the sequences) has a Poisson distribution, which seems implausible to me; and the geographic, magnitude, and temporal windows of the predictions were adjusted several times by the VAN 5 Captions. 
